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Farm Records Costs and Returns
Summaries – File C1-10 (2 pages)
2003  Costs and Returns – File
C1-11 (2 pages)
2003 Costs and Returns by Economic
Area – File C1-12 (2 pages)
2003 Costs and Returns for Special-
ized Farms – File C1-13 (2 pages)
2003 Crop and Livestock Costs – File
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1994–2003 Trends in Efficiency
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1994–2003 Trends in Income and
Returns – File C1-16 (2 pages)
Please add these files to your hand-
book and remove the out-of-date
material.
Farm export optimism and upgrading Mississippi
locks and dams
by Daryll E. Ray, Blasingame Chair of Excellence in Agricultural Policy,
Institute of Agriculture, University of Tennessee, and is the Director of
UT’s Agricultural Policy Analysis Center (APAC). (865) 974-7407;
dray@utk .edu;
A recent Senate committee’s approval of legislation thatauthorizes the upgrading of the Mississippi River lockand dam system brought this issue back into the public
spotlight. The Missis-
sippi River locks and
dams are an essential
part of the grain trans-
portation infrastruc-
ture of the central
U.S., inexpensively
delivering grain from
the nation’s breadbas-
ket to Gulf ports for
export shipment.
The system consists of
a series of 27 locks and
dams on the Missis-
sippi River above St.
Louis, Missouri, ensur-
ing a nine foot channel
for barge traffic as far
upstream as St. Paul,
Minnesota. The bulk of
the system was built in
the 1930s. The ques-
tion has been whether
or not this system
needs to be upgraded
to repair aging structures as
well as to meet the current
needs of shippers.
Agricultural producers and
their organizations have been
directly involved in lobbying
for the upgrade project. They
contend that it is necessary to
help U.S. farmers remain
competitive with producers
elsewhere in the world by
providing an efficient, low-cost
transportation system.
There are, no doubt, some very
good reasons for upgrading the
lock and dam system including
repairs of the effects of aging
and the opportunity to take
advantage of advances that
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have been made in riverine transportation
systems since the system was originally built.
On the other hand, it is important not to overes-
timate the positive impact it might have on
farmers and the price they receive for their
seeds and grains.
I say that because much of the original eco-
nomic justification for the system was based on
ten-year-old grain export projections that have
not materialized. Those familiar with grain
export numbers know that rather than the 2.65
billion bushels that were projected for the 2003
crop year, the numbers have come in at 2.05
billion bushels. In general, corn exports remain
flat at 20 percent below the 1979-1980 peak
levels.
This does not mean that we will not have a
spurt or even a long-term increase in corn
exports. However, betting on increased exports
based on hopes such that China will reverse a
centuries-long self-sufficiency policy and become
a major long-term U.S. customer seems like a
bet that is far from a sure thing.
None of this is to say that there won’t be ben-
efits of the lock and dam upgrade. There will.
The question is who will benefit. It may or may
not be the farmers who are arguing in favor of
the project. In fact, we can think of situations in
the future in which grain-belt farmers might
even be disadvantaged. We already see South
American soybean meal being shipped into the
Port of Wilmington (NC); something that I
would never have guessed in my wildest dreams
a decade ago.
Cargill is attempting to ship ethanol from
Brazil to the U.S. Again, that doesn’t mean that
barges full of Brazilian or Argentinean soybean
meal will be making their way up the Missis-
sippi River with a rebuilt system.
It also doesn’t mean that they won’t.
continued on page 3
Developments in GMO patent infringement cases
by Roger A. McEowen, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and Extension
Specialist, Agricultural Law and Policy, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kan-
sas. Member of Kansas and Nebraska Bars.
The ability to obtain a general utilitypatent on seed technology has led tocases in which farmers have been sued
for misappropriation of the technology. Because
seed is reproducible, any farmer that saves seed
is a natural competitor of a company that sells
seed. But, for seed that is patented, the saved
seed exemption of the PVPA is avoided, and the
saving of seed can be prohibited. Indeed, under
technology use agreements for genetically
modified seed presently in use, a farmer can use
the seed for one-time planting, may not supply
the seed to anyone else for planting, may not
save any crop produced from the seed for re-
planting (or supply saved seed to anyone else
for replanting) and must not use the seed or
provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research,
generation of herbicide registration data or seed
production.
Clearly, a farmer signing a technology agree-
ment is prohibited from saving seed subject to
the agreement. But, what if the patented traits
are present in the crops and/or resulting seed of
a farmer that did not purchase or plant the
patented seed? Has that farmer illegally in-
fringed the patent even though having no intent
to acquire the protected seed or infringe the
patent? So far, courts have held that the process
by which the patented seed arrives on a
farmer’s land is irrelevant. But, the tide may be
turning.
The innocent infringer defense - the ad-
vent of a doctrine of equitable enforce-
ment of patent laws?
The Canadian approach. In Monsanto
Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, the Canadian Court
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of Appeals held that Schmeiser, a Canadian
farmer, had infringed Monsanto’s patent on
Roundup Ready canola by saving and replanting
protected seed without a license. Schmeiser had
not paid a license fee to use the technology and
claimed that pollen drift from a neighbor’s fields
or passing grain trucks had contaminated his
fields. Schmeiser claimed that he did not know-
ingly acquire the technology or segregate the
contaminated seeds nor spray his crop with
Roundup. Indeed, Schmeiser had a long-stand-
ing farming practice of saving his own canola
seed and replanting that saved seed the follow-
ing year. Thus, the initial sources of contamina-
tion were an inadvertent, but nonetheless
unavoidable, result of a normal farming prac-
tice. However, the appellate court held that
Schmeiser had infringed Monsanto’s patent
because he either knew or should have known
that the subject seeds were glyphosate resis-
tant.
After the appellate court’s opinion in Schmeiser,
the Canadian Supreme Court rendered an
opinion concerning the patentability of the so-
called “Harvard Mouse.” In that case, the Court
held that a mouse, as a higher life form, was not
patentable under the specific wording of the
Canadian Patent Act. The Court noted that the
Canadian Patent Act provides for protection of
intellectual property rights in the “making,
constructing, and using [of an] invention and
selling it to others to be used.”14 The Canadian
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, with
the key questions being whether the genes and
cells of seeds and plants are covered by the
Patent Act in spite of the wording of the statute,
and whether plants and seeds are patentable in
light of the Court’s earlier opinion in Harvard
Mouse.
Upon review, the Canadian Supreme Court
ruled that plants, as a higher life form, are not
patentable subject matter, but that the
Monsanto patent at issue applied to the gene
and was valid. Schmeiser was found to have
infringed the patent because his “use” of the
patented invention deprived Monsanto of the
full enjoyment of the monopoly conferred by the
patent. The Court noted that mere possession
of a patented invention creates a rebuttable
presumption of “use,” and that the intent of the
alleged infringer may be relevant to rebutting
the presumption. The Court reasoned that
Schmeiser failed to provide sufficient evidence
to rebut the presumption of “use” and had
infringed Monsanto’s patent. On the issue of
damages, however, the court noted that the
Patent Act only entitles the patentee whose
patent has been infringed to the portion of the
infringer’s profit which is casually attributable
to the patented invention. Because Schmeiser
earned no profit from infringing Monsanto’s
patent, Monsanto was not entitled to damages.
Thus, Schmeiser was not required to pay
Monsanto any damages, penalties, court costs
or the technology use fee of $15 per acre.
Schmeiser, however, is barred from using
Roundup Ready canola unless he pays a license
fee, and must turn over any Roundup Ready
seeds remaining in his possession.
Key U.S. ruling. Three weeks before the
Canadian Supreme Court’s opinion in
Schmeiser, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, in Smithkline Beecham
Corp. v. Apotex Corporation, invalidated a
patent on a self-reproducing antidepressant
drug because previous clinical trials constituted
a prior use. In the 1970s, a British company
invented and patented paroxetine, an antide-
pressant drug. Eventually, the company devel-
oped a process to produce the crystalline hydro-
chloride salt of paroxetine, paroxetine hydro-
chloride (PHC). In 1980, Smithkline Beecham
(SB) received a license for the technology and
began manufacturing it. In the mid-1980s, an
SB chemist created a new crystalline form of
PHC known as PHC hemihydrate. SB was
awarded a patent for PHC hemihydrate in 1988
and began marketing it as Paxil in 1993. In
1998, Apotex sought approval from the Food
and Drug Administration to market its own
PHC antidepressant drug with PHC anhydrate
as the active ingredient. SB brought an in-
fringement action against Apotex in 1998
claiming that Apotex was infringing its PHC
hemihydrate patent by manufacturing PHC
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anhydrate tablets that necessarily contain, by
processes of nature, trace amounts of PHC
hemihydrate.
The trial court found that the hemihydrate that
SB created in 1984 had spread (i.e., seeded
itself) to numerous manufacturing environ-
ments, including those of Apotex. As a result,
under normal conditions in a seeded environ-
ment, some of the original anhydrate converted
spontaneously into the patented hemihydrate
crystals. The court upheld the patent’s validity,
but ruled that Apotex had not infringed the
patent because its production processes had
resulted in small, commercially insignificant
amounts of hemihydrate. The trial judge specifi-
cally noted that failing to limit the scope of the
patent would lead to inevitable infringement,
and opined that it is a defense to a charge of
patent infringement that the patentee caused
the infringement. In the agricultural setting,
that could mean that the judge would not hold a
conventional (or organic) crop farmer liable for
patent infringement when the reason for the
presence of the patented traits in growing or
harvested crops is cross-pollination, contamina-
tion from passing grain trucks or machinery, or
simply because trace amounts of the patented
genes and cells appear in conventional seed
stocks. However, by establishing a patent
infringement test of commercial significance,
the judge apparently would require any com-
mercially significant amounts of the patented
technology to be given back to the patentee.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court by noting that
any amount of hemihydrous PHC produced
(whether commercially viable or not) infringed
the patent, but agreed that Apotex had not
infringed the patent because SB’s clinical trials
constituted a prior use. As a result, the com-
pound was already in the public domain, and
SB’s patent was invalid.
A concurring opinion reasoned that the patent
was invalid not because of prior use of the
subject matter, but because the subject matter
was not patentable. The concurrence noted that
man-made products or processes are patentable,
but products that result from natural processes
are not patentable. Thus, PHC would qualify for
a patent because it is a man-made product, but
because the original paroxetine anhydrate could
naturally convert itself into the hemihydrate,
the resulting PHC is not patentable. The judge
compared the seeding and conversion process of
PHC to the spread of patented, biotech seed
traits via cross-pollination, and concluded that,
“[T[he implication – that the patent owner
would be entitled to collect royalties from every
farmer whose cornfields contained even a few
patented . . . stalks – cannot possibly be cor-
rect.” The judge went on to state, “. . . In short,
patent claims drawn broadly enough to encom-
pass products that spread, appear, and ‘repro-
duce’ through natural processes cover subject
matter unpatentable under Section 101 – and
are therefore invalid.”
Future implications
In any event, the trial judge’s comments in
Smithkline Beecham, the Federal Circuit’s
opinion (especially the concurrence) in the same
case and, to a lesser extent, the Canadian
Supreme Court’s opinion (particularly the
dissent) in Schmeiser provide a framework for
the development of future cases and legislation
supporting an equitable enforcement of patent
laws respecting both the rights of patentees and
the rights of innocent infringers.
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Is “residual fertilizer supply” in farmland
deductible? *
by Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture
and Professor of Economics, Iowa State University
Differences between taxpayers and theInternal Revenue Service over thedeductibility of fertilizer, lime and
other soil amendments have a long history. The
most recent conflict is over the question of
whether premium fertilizer levels or the “re-
sidual fertilizer supply” are deductible as
fertilizer under the statutory provision enacted
in 1960.
History of attempts to deduct fertilizer
costs
In keeping with the view that all expenditures
with a useful life of more than one year must be
depreciated or amortized, the Internal Revenue
Service in two early cases took the position
(which was upheld by the U.S. Tax Court) that
the cost of fertilizer and lime applied to land
was a capital expenditure which had to be
deducted over a period of years rather than all
being deductible in the year applied. In the first
of the two cases, Appeal of Sanford, the tax-
payer expended funds in an effort to restore soil
fertility (mostly in the form of labor) which
were deducted currently. IRS took the position
that expenditures were for the “preparation
and upbuilding of the land for future crop
production” and thus were capital in nature.
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner.
In the second case, Swaney v. Commissioner,
the taxpayer applied lime to farmland and
deducted the entire cost as a current trade or
business expense. IRS argued that the cost of
lime application was a capital expenditure
which could only be deducted at the rate of 10
percent per year. The Tax Court agreed that
the expenditure was capital in nature but
allowed a deduction at the rate of 25 percent
per year.
In a 1947 IRS ruling, the cost of lime spread on
farmland constituted an exhaustible capital
expenditure that had to be amortized over the
period of its effectiveness if the benefit of the
lime application extends over a period of several
years.
After several years of audit conflict over the
issue of the rate of amortization for fertilizer,
lime and other soil amendments, Congress
enacted in 1960 a provision allowing a current
deduction “…for the purchase or acquisition of
fertilizer, lime, ground limestone, marl, or other
materials to enrich, neutralize, or condition land
used in farming, or for the application of such
materials to such land.” To deduct such expendi-
tures currently, the taxpayer must be engaged
in the business of farming and the land involved
must have been used for the production of crops,
fruits or other agricultural products or for the
sustenance of livestock “before or simulta-
neously with the expenditures….” The regula-
tions state that “expenditures for the initial
preparation of land never previously used for
farming by the taxpayer or his tenant” are not
subject to the election.
The latest controversy
The latest controversy over deductibility of
fertilizer, lime and other soil amendments came
to light with release of a private letter ruling in
late 1991. In that ruling, Ltr. Rul. 9211007, a
farmer from West Central Minnesota purchased
a farm but had the farmer’s corporation (owned
64 percent by the farmer) purchase the “residual
fertilizer supply” in the land acquired. The
acquired land was then leased to the farmer’s
corporation under a one-year lease. The farmer
argued that the prior owner of the farm had
applied fertilizer to the point where an increased
level of fertilizer in the soil resulted, referred to
as the “residual fertilizer supply.” The corpora-
tion (as the taxpayer in the ruling) claimed an
continued on page 6
* Reprinted with permission from the January
16, 2004 issues of Agricultural Law Digest,
Agricultural Law Press Publications, Eugene,
Oregon. Footnotes not included.
. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
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(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
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amortization deduction over a seven-year period
for the residual fertilizer supply.
IRS agreed that capitalized farm fertilization
costs could be amortized, but the taxpayer must
be the beneficial owner of the fertilizer in order
to be permitted to claim an amortization deduc-
tion. IRS noted that the farmer acquired the
land containing the alleged residual fertilizer
supply:
“…which was incorporated into the
land and, for all practicable purposes,
was inseparable from the land. This
fertilizer reportedly made the land
more productive than it otherwise
would have been. Although the tax-
payer [the corporation] allegedly
purchased any residual fertilizer
supply in the land, the taxpayer was
able to derive the benefit from it only
by entering into a land lease agree-
ment with the landowners…”
The ruling points out that the landowners were
the beneficial owners of any fertilizer on the
land and the corporation could not amortize any
of the costs related to the fertilizer.
The ruling denied a deduction for the residual
fertilizer supply on two other grounds:
• As the ruling states, “…in order for a taxpayer
to claim an amortization deduction for
exhaustion of fertilizer acquired with the
land, the taxpayer must establish the
presence and extent of the fertilizer.” The
ruling notes that the corporation “…did not
measure nor was data provided to indicate,
the level of soil fertility attributable to
fertilizer applied to the land by the previous
owner.” The ruling concludes that the
corporation as the taxpayer failed to establish
the extent of any residual fertilizer.
• The ruling also notes that, in order to
amortize the cost of the fertilizer supply over
time, the taxpayer must in fact be exhausting
the fertilizer in the soil. In the facts of the
situation in the ruling, the soil test reports
showed that the level of fertility in the
majority of the parcels was not declining as is
required for deductibility. As the ruling
pointed out, “…the taxpayer has provided no
evidence indicating the period over which the
fertility attributable to the residual fertilizer
supply will be exhausted, and if in fact what
was claimed as the residual fertilizer level
was declining.”
The current situation
Surprisingly, although the 1991 ruling is sub-
stantial authority against deductibility of the
residual fertilizer supply, no further authority
has emerged in the dozen years since the ruling
was published even though the practice of
claiming a deduction has grown in some areas
of the country. Quite clearly, in the interest of
fairness and equity, further guidance is needed
as to the guidelines for deductibility if any is to
be allowed.
